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ABSTRACT 
Corlett (2019) raises two groups of challenges against the two-factor theory of delusions: One 
focuses on weighing “the evidence for … the two-factor theory”; the other aims to question 
“the logic of the two-factor theory” (ibid., p. 166). McKay (2019) has robustly defended the 
two-factor theory against the first group. But the second group, which Corlett believes is in 
many aspects independent of the first group and Darby (2019, p. 180) takes as “[t]he most 
important challenge to the two-factor theory raised by Dr. Corlett”, has by large remained. 
Here I offer my two cents in response to the second group. More specifically, I argue that 
Corlett’s challenges to the logic of the two-factor theory, concerning modularity, double 
dissociation and cognitive penetration, seem to be based on some misunderstandings of the 
two-factor theory. 
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cognitive penetration 
 
It is time to overturn the received wisdom. 
∼ Martin Davies, 2010, p. 502 
Corlett’s (2019) intriguing discussion covers many important issues, including modularity, 
double dissociation and cognitive penetration. He argues that the logic of the two-factor 
theory of delusions related to these issues is problematic. In the following, I shall begin with 
Corlett’s conception of the two-factor theory, then discuss Corlett’ challenges. After each 
challenge, I shall give my response in defence of the two-factor theory.  
Corlett’s conception of the two-factor theory 
In essence, the two-factor theory argues that two factors are needed to explain delusions. The 
first factor is an anomaly in the perceptual system and the second factor is a deficit in the 
belief evaluation system (e.g., Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Davies & Coltheart, 
2000; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001; Davies & Egan, 2013; Davies, McGill, & 
Davies (in press); Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Nie, 2016).1 According to Corlett, the two-
factor theory makes the following assumptions as well: 
(1) The first factor and the second factor are independent modules.2 
(2) The independence between perception and belief evaluation requires the support of 
double dissociation evidence. 
(3) Cognitive penetration is not permissible. 
Overall, they constitute what Corlett (2019, p. 166) calls the “logic of the two-factor theory”. 
                                                 
1 The two-factor theory is a family of accounts. They share this commitment but their views on the 
details of the two factors may vary. Though it seems that Corlett aims to challenge the two-factor 
theory in general, only a selection of papers mainly (co-)authored by Coltheart is mentioned, 
which represents a particular two-factor account. To make this commentary more straightforward, 
I shall focus on the papers cited by Corlett. But, I think, the arguments and explanations apply to 
the two-factor theory in general. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify this 
point.) 
2 Corlett (2019, p. 171) uses expressions like “factor-2, … is a module”.  This might be misconstrued 
as meaning that the deficit in the belief evaluation system is a module. I think what Corlett 
actually means by this expression is that the impaired belief evaluation system is a module. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, this commentary shall follow Corlett’s use. 
He directly challenges these three assumptions.3 
Corlett’s first challenge to Assumption (1): a puzzle 
The problem with Assumption (1), according to Corlett, is that there is a puzzle in assuming 
that the second factor is a module.4 The puzzle is that, on the one hand, Coltheart (1999) 
argues that modules are domain-specific, on the other hand, Corlett (2019, p. 171) thinks, 
“Coltheart insists” that the second factor, which is not domain-specific, is a module. 
Response 
It is correct that by modules Coltheart means domain-specific systems. However, the claim 
that Coltheart insists on the modularity of the second factor seems to be a misunderstanding. 
When Coltheart (2002) talks about delusions and the belief evaluation system, he emphasizes 
that the belief evaluation system is not modular. Following Fodor (1983), Coltheart’s concept 
of modularity is about low-level cognitive abilities such as visual perception, rather than 
high-level cognitive abilities such as belief evaluation. Besides, Coltheart makes it clear that 
the second factor corresponds to Fodor’s non-modular central system when he relates the 
                                                 
3 Darby (2019, p. 180) gives a different presentation of the assumptions Corlett argues against: “(1) 
Modularity of brain functions, (2) Unidirectional flow of information, and (3) Cognitive 
processes that cannot influence perceptual processes.” He does not include, what I call, 
Assumption (2) because, I think, his intention is not to give a summary of Corlett’s arguments 
but to provide “additional data” to support the related arguments (ibid., p. 178). I choose not to 
elaborate on, what I call, Assumption (3) because, as I shall argue later, the related discussions 
in both Corlett and Darby’s articles are mainly general statements which seem too ambiguous to 
be a clear argument against the two-factor theory. 
4 Corlett repeatedly claims that the modularity of mind and brain is a problem for the two-factor 
theory. But it is unclear whether he is also denying that in monothematic delusions the first factor 
is modular in Coltheart’s sense, that is the first factor is a domain-specific deficit (for a discussion 
on the empirical evidence, see also McKay, 2019). 
difficulty of understanding the nature of the second factor to the difficulty of understanding 
the nature of Fodor’s central system: 
This kind of attempt to explain delusions in cognitive-neuropsychological terms is 
particularly challenging precisely because cognitive psychology does not currently offer 
an adequate theory of the normal processes of belief formation and evaluation; perhaps 
Fodor’s first law is correct, which means that such a theory will never be found, in which 
case cognitive neuropsychiatry will never flourish. (Coltheart, 2002, p. 171) 
The two-factor theory proposes that the second factor is different from the first factor and 
may also accept that the first factor is a module in monothematic delusions (Coltheart, 2013). 
This, I suspect, is misconstrued as suggesting the second factor is a different module. Once 
the second factor is properly understood as a deficit in the non-modular belief evaluation 
system, the puzzle is cracked. 
Corlett’s second challenge to Assumption (1): an outdated view 
Another issue with modularity is that, both Corlett and Darby seem to think, the two-factor 
theory is committed to an outdated view according to which a mental function is not only 
implemented in a certain neuroanatomical module, but more importantly, a neuroanatomical 
module is restricted to a limited and specific region. They vigorously refute this view, taking 
it as a refutation of the two-factor theory as well. Corlett argues that “[m]odern network 
neuroscience [rejects] … rigidly ascribing functions to particular regions” (Corlett, 2019, p. 
173, emphasis added). Similarly, Darby argues that “numerous studies now show that 
complex brain processes result from the function of integrated brain networks rather than 
discrete brain regions” (Darby, 2019, p. 180, emphasis added). 
Response 
In this challenge, Corlett and Darby seem to be concerned with the two-factor theory’s 
proposal that the second factor is “neurally realized in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(rDLPFC)” which is a particular brain region (Coltheart et al., 2018, p. 234). The two-factor 
theory indeed argues that this proposal is supported by current evidence about the second 
factor in delusions. But it would be a misunderstanding to say that the two-factor theory has 
any a priori theoretical commitment to the view that all mental functions should be ascribed 
to particular regions. In fact, in one of the papers cited by Corlett, Coltheart and colleagues 
write explicitly that the belief evaluation system can involve different brain regions:5 
Current evidence suggests that [the impairment of belief evaluation] will be associated 
with right lateral prefrontal cortex pathology, but the belief evaluation system itself must 
involve a number of different cognitive subcomponents, and damage to any one of these 
subcomponents might disrupt inputs into the critical functioning of the right lateral 
prefrontal region. These different subcomponents will, of course, be realized in the brain 
as a neural circuit involving various brain regions, only one of which might be located in 
right lateral prefrontal cortex. (Coltheart et al., 2011, p. 286, emphasis added) 
To challenge the rDLPFC proposal, merely talking about the apparent similarity between the 
proposal and the “outdated” view in ascribing a mental function to a particular region is not 
enough. Rather, one needs to engage with the overall evidence provided by the two-factor 
theory (Colthear 2007; Coltheart et al., 2018). This is however absent in Corlett and Darby’s 
challenge (for a defence against Corlett’s challenge based on one particular piece of counter-
evidence, see McKay, 2019). 
Corlett’s challenges to Assumption (2): a lack of evidence and a paradox 
The problems with Assumption (2), according to Corlett, are: first there is no reported double 
dissociation evidence; second the assumption of double dissociation evidence would create a 
                                                 
5 Nie (2016) further develops the idea that the belief evaluation system involves not only different 
brain regions but also different functions. 
“paradox”. The double dissociation evidence in Corlett’s conception seems to be as follows: 
 (Capgras) patient A has a deficit in perception but no deficit in belief evaluation.6 
 Capgras patient B has a deficit in belief evaluation but no deficit in perception. 
This is why Corlett thinks that “[i]f Coltheart wishes … to be more confident of two 
dissociable, independent, factors in delusions, …he needs to find a patient with Capgras 
delusions who doesn’t have” a deficit in perception (Corlett, 2019, p. 169).7 Call this kind of 
evidence Corlett’s Double Dissociation Evidence (CDDE). The first problem, Corlett then 
argues, is that Capgras patient B which is necessary for CDDE has not been reported. The 
second problem, Corlett further argues, is that even if there were a reported Capgras patient B 
(and the two-factor theory might hence enjoy the fulfilment of the double dissociation 
evidence), the Capgras patient B who has only one deficit in belief evaluation would 
“paradoxically … obviate the two-factor theory” which requires two independent deficits 
(ibid.). 
Response 
In the first place, it is unclear why Corlett thinks that the lack of double dissociation between 
perception and belief evaluation is a problem for the two-factor theory. Here it would be 
helpful to make a distinction between the central claim of the two-factor theory, that is there 
are two conceptually distinct factors in delusions, and, what Davies and Egan (2013, p. 691) 
                                                 
6 It is not clear whether or not subject A in Corlett’s conception needs to be a Capgras patient. In any 
case, the discussion focuses on subject B. 
7 McKay seems to find Corlett’s demand of Capgras patient B confusing. He writes that “this is 
tantamount to demanding a patient with measles who hasn’t been exposed to the measles virus” 
(McKay, 2019, p. 186). Here, I’m trying to make plain Corlett’s consideration behind the 
demand. 
call, the dissociation argument for the two-factor theory, which says that a second factor is 
needed to explain delusions because there are cases in which the subjects have the first factor 
but not the delusion. Corlett’s paper begins with an introduction of the dissociation argument. 
Does Corlett mean that the lack of double dissociation evidence is a problem for the 
dissociation argument? This cannot work because the dissociation argument depends on 
single, rather than double, dissociation evidence (for a review of the single dissociation 
evidence in monothematic delusions, see Coltheart, Langdon & McKay, 2011). 
Is the lack of double dissociation evidence a problem for the central claim? Admittedly, some 
kind of double dissociation evidence can support the central claim. But it is not necessary for 
the claim because, first of all, the current two-factor claim is based on single, rather than 
double, dissociation evidence. More importantly, the two-factor claim itself is compatible 
with various possible relationships between the first factor and the second factor at either the 
functional level or the neuroanatomical level. Consider a possibility according to which it is 
an empirical fact, probably due to the neuroanatomical overlap, that the first factor and the 
second factor always appear together in delusions. Consider another possibility according to 
which the first factor of delusions is so anomalous that it will impede the execution of our 
rational ability (for a similar idea, see Hoerl, 2018). Consider yet another possibility 
according to which the second factor contributes to the formation of the first factor or they 
have some degree of mutual influence. In these possibilities, even though there is no double 
dissociation between the first factor and the second factor, the central claim obtains.8 
                                                 
8 I think even the single dissociation evidence is not necessary for the two-factor claim. Admittedly, 
the current two-factor theory is mainly based on the dissociation argument. In these possibilities, 
the possible two-factor theories would be based on some different arguments from the dissociation 
argument. Nonetheless, in both cases the central claim obtains. (I’m grateful to an anonymous 
In short, the lack of double dissociation evidence is neither a problem for the dissociation 
argument nor a problem for the central claim. In other words, it is not a problem for the 
current two-factor theory and would not be a problem for the possible two-factor theories in 
these possibilities. 
Now let us consider what kind of double dissociation evidence is needed if there were 
someone who wanted a double dissociation between perception and belief evaluation. Let us 
also put aside the issue that double dissociation is typically about two low-level cognitive 
abilities and does not involve high-level belief evaluation. In my understanding, it should be: 
 Subject A has a deficit in perception but no deficit in belief evaluation. 
 Subject B has a deficit in belief evaluation but no deficit in perception. 
Call this kind of evidence the Simple Double Dissociation Evidence (SDDE). The main 
difference between SDDE and CDDE is that subject B in the latter is a Capgras patient. 
Corlett’s claim is correct that CDDE would be a problem for the two-factor theory because it 
contains a deluded subject with only one deficit rather than two. But, SDDE is compatible 
with the two-factor theory because it does not contain a deluded subject with only one deficit. 
That is to say, even if a two-factor theorist wanted some double dissociation evidence, she 
could simply look for the unproblematic SDDE. Corlett provides no reason why the two-
factor theorist has to ask for the paradoxical CDDE.9 
Corlett’s challenge to Assumption (3): another outdated view 
Corlett (2019) and Darby (2019) take the two-factor theory as rejecting top-down influences 
                                                                                                                                                       
reviewer for raising the concern about the relationship between the dissociation argument and the 
two-factor theory.) 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify the point in this paragraph. 
from belief to perception. This is a problem because, they argue, many recent works have 
shown that there is some degree of top-down influence. 
Response 
Corlett admits that the rejection of top-down influence is not an explicit claim of the two-
factor theorists. But why does Corlett still think that it is implicit in the two-factor theory? He 
writes: 
[T]wo-factor theory is not explicit about cognition penetrating perception, but two factor 
theorists claim that perception and belief are dissociated modules, with a uni-directional 
flow of information from perception to belief (else only one factor damage to top-down 
belief effects—would suffice …), so the rejection of cognitive penetration is implicit and 
I believe essential to two-factor theory as espoused by Coltheart and colleagues. (Corlett, 
2019, p. 173, emphasis added) 
It looks to me that Corlett might have two reasons. The first reason seems to be that the two-
factor theory assumes that perception and belief evaluation are double-dissociable modules. I 
have argued that this is not true. The second reason seems to be that if the two-factor theory 
allows top-down influences, then “one only factor damage”, rather than two factors, “to top-
down belief effects … would suffice”. It is not clear what Corlett means by “one only factor 
damage” and why it is a problem for the two-factor theory. If it means neuroanatomical 
damage, such as the one proposed by Darby, Laganiere, Pascual-Leone, Prasad, and Fox 
(2017), then it is consistent with the two-factor theory in the sense that the two-factor theory 
allows that the perceptual deficit and the belief evaluation deficit at the functional level share 
same neuroanatomical damage (McKay & Furl, 2017). If it means functional damage, say, 
some damage to the prediction-error mechanism, then it is also not straightforwardly against 
the two-factor theory (for a view arguing that the prediction-error theory and the two-factor 
theory are compatible, see Miyazono, Bortolotti, & Broome, 2015). In short, the claim that 
the two-factor theory implicitly rejects cognitive penetration seems to be unfounded. 
Conclusion 
In his classic paper on double dissociation, Davies reminds us to be cautious of the received 
wisdom about a theory which is some inaccurate assumption that “many people believe—or 
many people believe that many people believe” the theory is based on (Davies, 2010, p. 501). 
If my analysis so far is along the right lines, then it seems that Corlett’s challenges to the 
logic of the two-factor theory are mainly about the questionable assumptions which are 
misconstrued as the basis of the two-factor theory. Once the received wisdom about the two-
factor theory is identified and overturned, the challenges should be gone with it. Despite 
disagreeing with Corlett’s challenges to the two-factor theory, I believe that Corlett’s own 
prediction-error theory looks to be a viable account with many distinguished contributions. 
Taking different theories together, I think, would be a better way to further advance our 
understanding of delusions. 
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